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dc.contributor.authorLetanovská, Mária
dc.date.accessioned2020-10-16T10:29:01Z
dc.date.available2020-10-16T10:29:01Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.issn1339-5130
dc.identifier.urihttp://drepo.uniza.sk/handle/hdluniza/285
dc.description.abstractBased on the London´s airports example it is obvious that there are differences between 3rd level airports. If the same coordination system would be introduced within various coordinated airports it could lead to various results. The results of analysis of intra-EU route data indicate that larger aircraft have been used at the 3rd level airports and there is no strong evidence of inefficient slot hoarding at these airports, not only before but also after the EC’s recognition of secondary slot trading. In contrast, the analysis of slot trading at Heathrow and Gatwick show that slot trading has taken place more likely within alliance and the chances have been very small for carriers to obtain slots from their actual or potential competitors. For the time being, there may be no need for additional regulatory interventions into secondary slot trading as there is little evidence of inefficient slot hoarding. However, the scarce opportunity of slot trading may lead to less intense competition and then to less efficient use of slots in the long run.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Zilinaen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subjectslot allocationen_US
dc.subjectcoordinationen_US
dc.subjectthird level airportsen_US
dc.subjectstrategyen_US
dc.titleDifferent Allocation Systemsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.26552/tac.C.2014.1.4


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